Abstract: Belief fragments and mental files are based on the same idea: that information in people's minds is compartmentalized rather than lumped all together. While some authors (Cherniak 1986; Egan 2008) occasionally describe fragments as 'mental files,' philosophers mostly use the two notions differently, though...

Abstract: Many debates in philosophy focus on whether folk or scientific psychological notions pick out cognitive natural kinds. Examples include memory, emotions and concepts. A potentially interesting kind of kind is: kinds of mental representations (as opposed, for example, to kinds of psychological faculties). In...

Introduction et co-direction du symposium sur le livre de Pierre Steiner, Désaturer l'esprit. Usages du pragmatisme, 2019, Paris, Questions Théoriques. Avec des contributions de Marta Carava, Jean-Marie Chevalier, Roberta Dreon et Pierre Steiner. Ce premier symposium en langue française inaugure une nouvelle série de symposiums qui...

Considering the persisting disagreement between the common sense philosophers and the sceptics, it seems that they are faced with a deep epistemic disagreement. Taking stock from Wittgenstein's On Certainty, one generally thinks that deep epistemic disagreements cannot be rationally resolved. Hinge epistemology, inherited from Wittgenstein,...

Abstract: We argue that the most ambitious version of the mental files theory of singular thought, according to which mental files are a wide-ranging psychological natural kind underlying all and only singular thinking, is unsupported by the available psychological data. Nevertheless, critical examination of the...

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