02 Déc Practical Reasoning and Free Will
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Elizabeth Anscombe’s Intention
is silent about the problem of free will. But one is allowed to look for some lights on it in Anscombe’s analysis of practical reasoning, since a free action, as she argues in different papers, is undetermined. The distinction between causes and reasons of an intentional action is not sufficient to defend its freedom, since it can be argued that reasons determine the action of a rational agent, or the decision, being indifferent to reasons (and causes), would be a lucky one. Anscombe’s conception of the defeasibility of practical reasoning leads me to show that a free choice involves not only the choice of the means but also a ranking of the end that has no contrastive reasons for it, without being irrational and lucky.
Texte d’une contribution à un colloque sur Elizabeth Anscombe et la philosophie morale, tenu à Rome en février 2008, et paru dans une traduction italienne en décembre 2010, sous le titre “Ragionamento pratico e libero volere”.
a cura di Juan Andres Mercado, Elizabeth Anscombe et il Rinnovamento della psicologia morale
, Armando Editore, Studi di Filosofia 36, p. 97-112.